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Recent revisions to the theory and definition of payments for ecosystem services (PES) challenge 
the generally accepted dominance of direct incentives provided in a buyer–seller relationship. 
The revisionist thinking insists indirect incentives and a cooperative, reciprocal relationship are 
often more appropriate. Those characteristics, however, hark back to the indirect, cooperative 
interventions that constitute “community conservation”, which PES was originally designed as 
an improvement over. In that context, this study revisits the criticisms and potential benefits of 
community conservation. We analyze a case study of community conservation in Peru and find 
that it supported an uptake of forest-friendly behaviors. We take up the suggestion of a two-stage 
approach to PES, but refine it based on our results that indicate an important role for cognitive 
(e.g. education) alongside structural interventions (e.g. provision of alternatives), and a strong 
role for social consensus to support conservationist behavior. Community conservation can 
provide these elements in a first-stage of PES to create a social context conducive to 
conservation. Without creating that context first, PES could destabilize local resource 
management norms rather than improve on them. With the social context established, however, a 








1. Introduction  
 
The 1980’s saw the rise of decentralized, community-based approaches to natural resource 
management and biodiversity conservation (Hutton et al., 2005). Approaches called community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) or integrated conservation and development 
projects (ICDPs) became collectively known as community conservation. Community 
conservation attempts to create a link between development and conservation, so both can be 
achieved simultaneously. That often involves indirect mechanisms such as (McNeely et al., 
2005): 1) redirecting labor and capital away from activities that degrade ecosystems (e.g., 
agricultural intensification); 2) encouraging commercial activities that supply ecosystem services 
(ES) as joint outputs (e.g., ecotourism); or 3) raising incomes to reduce dependence on resource 
extraction that degrades the ecosystem. 
 
The successful uptake of the community conservation narrative, however, was in large part due 
to the popularized political and economic ideals of the time (Hutton et al., 2005) and came up 
against significant criticism (McNeely et al., 2005). For example, a 1999 World Bank review of 
integrated conservation and development projects in Indonesia concluded, “most of the attempts 
to enhance biodiversity conservation in Indonesia through ICDPs are unconvincing and unlikely 
to be successful under current conditions.” (Wells et al., 1999, pp. 44). Specifically, the indirect 
mechanisms that constitute community conservation were criticized for not being cost-effective 
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002), not necessarily ensuring that conservation will occur (Wunder, 
2005), and for permitting alternative livelihood strategies to be incorporated as complements, 
rather than substitutes, to ecosystem-degrading activities (Engel et al, 2008). Directly paying 
people to conserve nature—effectively creating a market for the ecosystem services provided—
was advocated as the conservation intervention that could overcome these issues, and the concept 
of payments for ecosystem services (PES) took hold. 
 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are a standard economic behavior for some types of 
services, notably provisioning services (e.g. food, fiber). Market creation for a broader collection 
of ecosystem services, particularly regulating and cultural services, has grown worldwide since 
about 1997 with PES schemes established in New York (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1998) and Costa 
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Rica (Pagiola, 2008). A 2010 review of payments for watershed services identified 113 active 
programs in 22 countries (Stanton et al, 2010), while a review of forest carbon markets identified 
226 projects in 40 countries in 2009 (Hamilton et al, 2010). 
 
Following the critique of community conservation and the indirect mechanisms it constitutes, the 
recent growth of PES has generally followed the theory that providing incentives for 
conservation in the form of conditional, direct cash payments is the first-best conservation 
mechanism (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2005).  A growing realization that PES theory did 
not match real world practices, however, culminated with a broader re-conceptualization of PES. 
They are now viewed as a class of incentive-based mechanisms, of which direct cash incentives 
are one example, but other indirect and in-kind incentives are often (and perhaps more often) 
used, and conditionality is not always strictly enforced (Jack et al., 2008; Sommerville et al, 
2009; Muradian et al, 2010; Farley and Costanza, 2010). Along with that re-definition grew an 
understanding that the buyer-seller paradigm of PES that was advocated under the original PES 
theory (Wunder, 2005) is not always appropriate, but that in many contexts a cooperative and 
reciprocal arrangement is needed (Muradian et al, 2010; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Fisher et al, 
2010; van Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010).  
 
These two core elements in the revisionist PES thinking—use of indirect and in-kind incentives, 
and focus on cooperative and reciprocal arrangements—hark back to the community 
conservation that PES was originally developed as an improvement over. So, despite the 
criticism of community conservation, economists are now returning to it, or at least arguing for 
active inclusion of some of its elements in PES design. That calls for another look at community 
conservation, specifically reconciliation of economists’ original critique of community 
conservation with their current return to it.  
 
One suggestion is that the original criticism of community conservation overlooked the positive 
changes it had on people’s attitudes and behaviors towards conservation. As put by Abbot and 
Thomas (2001) in a case study of integrated conservation and development in Cameroon: “…the 
livelihoods program…is changing people's attitudes and behaviors, making them more positively 
disposed toward forest protection and the demarcation of the (buffer zone) boundary. These 
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findings are significant since there are few published studies that have attempted to look at the 
outcomes, rather than the outputs, of ICDPs” (pp. 1133, emphasis added). 
 
In this paper, we take on the challenge of Abbot and Thomas (2001) to evaluate the outcomes of 
community conservation. We analyze a case study of using community conservation to conserve 
Polylepis forest fragments in the Vilcanota Range of the southern Peruvian Andes. Economic 
analyses of both 1) reported conservation behavior by local landholders; and 2) locals’ value of 
the ecosystem services (ES) provided by Polylepis woodlands, are carried out to see if 
community conservation positively disposes locals towards forest protection, and if so, through 
what mechanisms. Placing the results of the case study in the context of PES revisionist thinking 
and the behavioral literature that it invokes, we discuss the lessons from community conservation 
and how that may inform a two-stage approach to PES. 
 
After this introduction, the next section discusses the study site, while the following sections in 
turn present the methodology, results, and a discussion of community conservation and two-stage 
PES, followed by conclusions. 
 
2. Case Study 
2.1. Polylepis Woodlands 
Polylepis woodlands are the highest in the world, growing up to 4,400 meters above sea level in 
humid conditions and as high as 5,000 meters in the arid volcanic soils of north-western Bolivia 
(Purcell et al, 2004). In the Andes Mountains of South America, about 20 species of Polylepis, 
locally known as queuña (various spellings), range from Venezuela south to central Argentina 
(Kessler, 2002). The trees stand 1-20 meters tall and characteristically shed their bark. Polylepis 
forests are one of the most threatened Neo-tropical ecosystems: 15 species of Polylepis are 
classified as vulnerable, nine of which are native to Peru (IUCN, 2010). The ecosystem provides 
an important habitat to many birds and mammals. In the case study area, of the bird species 
dependent on Polylepis, seven were classified as endangered, five as vulnerable and nine as near-
threatened in 2005 (Aucca & Ramsay, 2005). In other locations, these woodlands also provide an 
important habitat for more than 30 mammal species (Yensen & Tarifa, 2002) including 
charismatic species such as the spectacled bear and puma. 
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The current distribution of Polylepis, although likely affected by some natural restrictions 
(Kessler, 2002), is predominantly determined by human activity related to subsistence practices. 
Describing the case study area in the southern Peruvian Andes, Aucca and Ramsay (2005) define 
four major anthropogenic threats to Polylepis. Three of these are related to agricultural practices: 
allowing livestock to graze in or near forest patches, burning of adjacent grassland (to 
supposedly speed regeneration of pastures), and transforming woodlands to agricultural land. 
The final and most prevalent anthropogenic threat is felling trees for fuelwood and timber. 
 
Patches of Polylepis are thus generally restricted to areas where fires cannot spread and livestock 
do not regularly roam (Fjeldsa, 2002). The remaining patchwork is then refined by the intensity 
of fuelwood collection and feasibility of agriculture. The people living in the case study area, 
whose livelihoods depend on the forest, recognize the threats to Polylepis and note a decline in 
the quality of the trees in the forest (Jameson & Ramsay, 2007). They continue these forest-
degrading practices, however, because they have no other means of getting the wood they need 
to survive (Aucca & Ramsay, 2005) and lack alternatives to current agricultural practices. 
 
Polylepis woodlands provide more than wood and land. They also provide ES (Table 1) that are 
valuable on a local, regional, and global scale. Probably the most important service they provide 
is the regulation of water supply (Fjeldsa, 2002), which may become more important as tropical 
glaciers retreat and dry-season melt-water declines in volume (Jameson & Ramsay, 2007). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.2. Livelihoods in the Vilcanota Range 
Key socio-demographic characteristics of sampled households located in the Vilcanota Range 
are summarized in Table 2. Land held by a household for crop cultivation is owned by the 
community or land association to which they belong. Households plant multiple crop cycles each 
year to maximize production on their small plots. The main crops cultivated are potatoes, beans, 
oca, olluca, and maize, with legume cultivation more prevalent at higher altitudes and maize at 
 6
lower altitudes. A strong barter market helps trade in the region, with these high altitude farmers 
trading for fruits, sugar, coffee, and coca cultivated in lower areas. 
 
Each household also keeps grazing animals on communal land, with alpaca and llama more 
popular in the higher altitudes and horses and cattle more popular at lower altitudes. The main 
purposes of keeping livestock are to help carry heavy loads of crops or fuelwood and to supply 
wool as a cash crop. Households slaughter only one or two large animals a year, but supplement 
their protein intake with chickens and guinea pigs. 
 
Aside from subsistence production and barter trading, each household earns cash income from 
farm activities, such as the sale of produce, livestock, or wool, and non-farm activities. The latter 
includes running a small shop, selling maize beer, women selling handicrafts, and men working 
as porters (for tourist treks) or construction workers. Despite the diversity in livelihoods, the area 
is still impoverished, with 60 percent of households (in 2008) living in extreme or moderate 
poverty. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.3. Conservation in the Vilcanota Range 
La Asociación Ecosistemas Andinos (ECOAN) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
based in Cuzco, Peru, dedicated to preserving endangered Peruvian wildlife, particularly rare 
endemic and migratory bird species. ECOAN approaches its mission through community 
conservation. The organization’s largest and longest standing project is a community-based 
Polylepis forest conservation project in the Vilcanota range of the southern Peruvian Andes. The 
range runs along the north-east side of the Sacred Valley between Cuzco and Machu Picchu. 
Since 2000, this project has formally enlisted more than 1,800 families (of 7,299) in 21 
communities and informally benefited even more through its various initiatives to reduce 




To help secure a forest-friendly future for this region, ECOAN is working to identify and 
implement long-term strategies to sustain the conservation successes of its Vilcanota project, 
including a self-sustaining financing strategy that permits the NGO to reduce its involvement 
(Aucca, 2006). Despite its focus on community conservation, ECOAN has taken smalls steps 
towards establishing PES to reach these goals. A pilot effort was carried out to charge bird 
watchers to enter a community-owned private conservation area (PCA). Proving successful, the 
pilot indicated a potential exit strategy; ecotourism may allow ECOAN to build on its strong 
base of community conservation and transition the Vilcanota project to a self-financing 
conservation initiative. Looking beyond the ES of scenic beauty and biodiversity protection, 
there may be potential to include other ES in a broad-reaching PES scheme, particularly water 
services provided to downstream communities (located in the Sacred Valley and beyond) and 
carbon services (globally beneficial). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Sitting between its initial remit as an externally-supported community conservation project and 
its potential future as conservation based on a market mechanism, the Vilcanota project provides 
an opportunity to explore the outcomes of community conservation and how that relates to the 
potential future implementation of PES. Importantly, this provides a good case study because 
when data was collected, the market structure for PES was lacking. As such, this study does not 
compound the effects of implementing PES market structure with the outcomes of community 
conservation, which is the focus of this paper. 
 
3. Methodology 
We first explore if there is a relationship between community conservation activities carried out 
in the area, and the behavior and attitudes of local communities. For this purpose, a household 
survey was carried out to collect information in four categories: demographics, land ownership, 
household income, and reported behavior related to forest patches. That information was 
supported by information about the communities these surveys were carried out in, including 
community conservation activities that had occurred in each. 
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Second, we estimate the value locals place on ES in order to facilitate better understanding of 
conservation behavior, specifically whether there is a relationship between community 
conservation activities and the locally-held value of ES. The value of ES was estimated through 
an innovative contingent valuation (CV) approach that was carried out as part of the household 
survey (for discussion of CV through household surveys see, e.g., Mitchell and Carson, 1989, 
Bateman et al, 2002). Details of this approach are described below. 
 
3.1. Reported Conservation Behavior 
Without rigorous monitoring in the Vilcanota range, it was only feasible to rely on reported 
behavior related to the four primary forest-degrading activities identified by Aucca and Ramsay 
(2005). The survey section on household income included three subsections related to forest 
products, crop cultivation, and livestock rearing, where respondents were asked about the 
financial and economics costs and benefits of each. At the end of each subsection there were 
questions on damaging activities related to the relevant anthropogenic threats to Polylepis: the 
forest products section included a question on felling trees for fuel and timber, the crop section 
included a question on transforming woodland for cultivation, and the livestock section included 
a question on grazing livestock in and around woodlands, and another on burning grasslands. 
 
To reduce response bias, for each question on a damaging activity, respondents were first 
reminded that other families in the area were known to carry out the activity. Then they were 
asked if their household currently carried out the activity and if they had carried it out in the past 
(i.e., 3-7 years ago, prior to the involvement of ECOAN). If the respondent reported a change in 
the level of an activity between the past and present (either started, increased, reduced, or 
completely stopped), they were then asked why the level of that activity changed (Appendix). 
 
3.2. Local Value of ES 
In a situation where respondents own the resources they are being asked to protect, it is not 
feasible to directly ask them their willingness-to-pay (WTP) to preserve those resources. The 
value of ES held by the local population was therefore elicited indirectly using the novel 
approach proposed by Mourato and Smith (2002) comprising three steps. In that approach, 
respondents were first asked for the compensation they would require to switch land use from 
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their current destructive activities (e.g. slash and burn agriculture) to less environmentally 
degrading practices (e.g. agroforestry). Mourato and Smith found that in estimating the required 
compensation amount for changing these activities (i.e. willingness to accept; WTA), 
respondents only took into consideration the short-term financial losses implied in the change in 
land use and not the non-market benefits arising for the enhanced ES provision under the more 
environmentally friendly land use. Hence, in a second step, respondents were engaged in a 
discussion of forest ES and asked to identify the range of services they benefited from, both 
market and non-market (e.g. shade, protection from wind, soil protection, leaving forest for 
descendents, etc.). In the third and final step, respondents were asked if they wanted to revise the 
required compensation amount stated initially, now taking into consideration the fact that 
switching to a more environmentally friendly land use would preserve many locally beneficial 
ES. The authors found that, on average, respondents reduced their WTA by approximately 30%, 
which can be interpreted as the implied local value of the provision of ES associated with the 
change in land use (WTPIMPLIED). 
 
Adopting this approach, respondents of the survey in the Vilcanota Range were asked twice 
about their willingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation to change current land use in part of their 
farm by setting land aside for reforestation with Polylepis, and therefore become ES providers. 
Following a household survey of the economic costs and benefits of agriculture, livestock 
cultivation and forest products, respondents were first asked for their minimum annual WTA 
compensation to conserve 0.33 hectares of their land that had been reforested with Polylepis. It 
was clearly stated that the capital costs of reforestation (e.g. saplings) were to be covered by 
external funding, because the aim was to elicit a value that was representative of the annual 
opportunity costs of land and labor into the foreseeable future. To reduce overbidding, the WTA 
question was also placed in a competitive context by explaining that if it went ahead “There 
would not be much money for this sort of project, so only those families with the lowest prices 
would be considered for the project”. 
 
Respondents were then led through a discussion of the ways in which they might benefit from ES 
provided by Polylepis. The discussion involved agreeing or disagreeing with statements about 10 
of the key ES provided by Polylepis woodland (as listed in Table 1).  
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Finally, respondents were asked again for their WTA compensation to change land use, but now 
taking into account the ES associated with the proposed reforested land. The difference between 
the WTA to change land use before and after the discussion about ES is an estimate of the value 
of forest ES to the households, measured as implied willingness-to-pay (WTPIMPLIED), where 
WTPIMPLIED = WTABEFORE – WTAAFTER. WTPIMPLIED is therefore expressed in terms of a 
foregone compensation. 
 
The WTPIMPLIED was in this case a better measure than WTP determined through direct 
questioning of respondents, because WTPIMPLIED is derived from direct WTA questions. Here, a 
direct WTA question is the correct measure of value based on the reference point of the 
respondents1. In the case of residents of the Vilcanota Range, the hypothetical market was a 
decrease in agricultural land that would be reforested and provide ES. The most salient portion of 
that scenario to respondents is the loss of agricultural land, meaning that the reference point is 
current land holding, which is the initial state. If the basis for valuation is a reference of the 
initial state then the appropriate measure of its value is compensating variation (Knetsch, 2009). 
Since WTA compensation is the compensating variation for the loss of current land holdings, the 
local value of ES can then be correctly estimated in an indirect way, through the difference 
between two WTA compensation amounts. 
 
Finally, in order to elicit WTA, Mourato and Smith attempted to use both the open-ended and the 
dichotomous choice methods, but only found the open-ended question to be feasible in this 
specific context (see Mourato and Smith, 2002 for more details). As such, an open-ended format 
for eliciting WTA was used here, where respondents were asked to think through the various 
costs and benefits associated with both their current land uses and with the proposed land use 
                                                 
1
 Although traditional theories of economic behavior claim that WTP to increase welfare should be equal to WTA to 
avoid that same level in decrease of welfare, numerous studies have been carried out demonstrating a WTP-WTA 
asymmetry (reviewed in the context of environmental changes in Horowitz and McConnell 2002). Attention has 
been given to the limits of this asymmetry and potential explanations for its occurrence that are consistent with 
standard theory. The dominant standard theory explanation based on research demonstrating a lack of asymmetry is 
that the WTP-WTA disparity decreases with increased experience, thus changing an individual’s reference point. 
Evidence for this explanation, however, is weak (Horowitz and McConnell 2002). Knetsch (2009) claims that 
experience is not necessarily relevant, but it is specifically the reference point of an individual that will determine 
whether or not they exhibit WTP-WTA disparity. 
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(reforestation) in order to arrive at a realistic and meaningful compensation amount, that would 
reimburse them for lost income. 
 
3.3. Sampling and Survey Implementation 
A three-day pilot survey was carried out in Thastayoc, a remote community in the Vilcanota 
range that was the first to work with ECOAN. A final survey was then administered to 
representatives of 106 households in six of the 21 communities that ECOAN now works with in 
the area (Table 4). Key sample characteristics were presented in Table 2. The survey was 
conducted face to face by the researchers and local assistants, in Spanish and Quechua. Semi-
structured interviews with community and NGO leaders were also carried out to provide further 
context for the quantitative results. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Households were sampled using a mix of opportunity and snowball sampling. There is little 
variation in socio-economic status or lifestyle within communities, so there is no reason to 
believe that results from an opportunity sample would differ greatly from a random or 
probabilistic sample. To mitigate any difference that may occur, however, sampling was carried 
out at varying times of day and in both households and agricultural fields. The communities 
surveyed were chosen based on various factors, but the primary concern was to survey 
communities that ranged in accessibility. Those that were less accessible tended to be more 
remote and poor and are believed to be more dependent on Polylepis forests, but without 
sustainable management practices have lost those forests more rapidly. In contrast, the more 
accessible communities are relatively less poor and less dependent on Polylepis forests.  
 
3.4. Regression Analyses 
To better understand reported reduction in forest-degrading activities and WTPIMPLIED as well as 
ECOAN’s impact on both, two regression analyses were carried out. The first analyzed the 
factors that affect whether a household acts to conserve Polylepis or not. The dependent variable 
is the probability of being a conservationist household (as strictly defined above), so based on 
this dichotomous response variable a logistic (logit) regression was used. The second analyzed 
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WTPIMPLIED for ES. Given the continuous nature of the response variable an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression was used.  
 
To allow some comparability of results between the two analyses, both regression models were 
specified with the same explanatory variables (Table 5). We used a build-up blocking approach, 
where categories of variables that were expected to influence willingness to pay and/or 
conservation behaviour were sequentially included in the model. The key categories of 
explanatory variables analyzed were demographics (e.g. age, education, household size), 
household income (broken down by income source), land holdings characteristics, and activities 
carried out by ECOAN in the household’s community. 
 
In this process, variables that did not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable 
were removed. This was done, however, across both models concurrently so that if an 
explanatory variable was significant in one model it was maintained in both (e.g. WIFE). Some 
explanatory variables that were not significantly correlated to the response variable in either 
regression were however maintained in the model specifications to demonstrate validity of the 
results. For example, to demonstrate that no underlying, unseen demographic variables were 
distorting results, AGE, EDUCATION, and HOUSEHOLD_SIZE were maintained in the final 
model specifications. Additionally, CROP_INCREASE and CROP_DECREASE were also 
maintained to demonstrate that variable, short-term changes in land productivity were not 
disproportionately affecting conservationist behavior or value of ES. Moreover, it is an 
interesting result in itself that variables such as AGE or EDUCATION are found to be 
insignificant. Finally, incomes from all sources were included in the final model specification 
because when total income was included it was significant in both regressions, as economic 
theory might dictate. It was important, however, to recognize that total income comprises income 
from various activities with different relationships to woodlands and so variables for all income 
sources were included in the final models. 
 





4.1. Reported Change in Forest-degrading Activities 
Seventy one percent of sampled households have at some point carried out at least one of the 
four human activities that threaten Polylepis forests, currently carrying out two on average. Of 
those households, 61 percent (43 percent of total sample) reported reducing or stopping all forest 
degrading activities since the start of ECOAN’s conservation efforts. Adding this to the 30 
percent of respondents that claimed to have never carried out any of these forest degrading 
activities, 73 percent of all households appear to be conservationist households, representing a 
reported 143 percent rise in the number of conservationist households in the area since ECOAN 
began working there. 
 
To further minimise any potential social desirability bias arising from respondents’ self-reported 
behaviour, we adopted a very conservative definition of a conservationist household: that is, a 
household that has reduced or stopped all of the forest degrading activities it once carried out, or 
a household that reported never having carried out any of those activities (in the past or 
currently). 
 
Looking now at the level of change per activity (rather than per household), across all 
households there was a reported 68 percent reduction in forest degrading activities (Table 6). In 
addition, the majority of the reported reasons for reducing an activity were related to ECOAN’s 
initiatives in the area. Specifically, the proportion of households that reported reducing each 
activity and stated a motivation attributable to ECOAN is 81 percent for fuelwood, 53 percent for 
livestock grazing, 68 percent for agricultural transformation, and 63 percent for burning 
grasslands. Those reductions can be attributed to the work of ECOAN because after reporting an 
increase or decrease in an activity, respondents were asked why the level of that activity 
changed. Based on the follow-up question and aggregating over all four forest-degrading 
activities, 69 percent of the (gross) reported reduction is attributable to ECOAN (Table 7). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
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Of the reasons for a reduction in forest-degrading activities given by respondents, three 
categories are attributable to community conservation work carried out by ECOAN as shown in 
Table 7. First, conservation refers to respondents’ belief in the need to conserve, which is 
attributable to ECOAN’s educational activities. Second, energy use change is attributable to 
ECOAN’s provision of alternative fuels to Polylepis (e.g. Eucalyptus) and more energy-efficient 
stoves. Finally, the most prominent reported reason for reducing forest degradation was 
prohibitions in use of the forest. Although prohibitions were put in place by the government, it 
was ECOAN’s involvement in the community that motivated respondents to adhere to them. 
Peru’s Forest Law (Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre) was first introduced in 1975.  It initially 
focused on placing the rights of forest extraction in the hands of the State, but has changed over 
time and is now intended to structure sustainable use of forest resources (Charpentier & Hidalgo, 
1999). Enforcement has historically been weak, particularly considering the dependence of rural 
communities on clearing or extraction of forests. Before working with any community, however, 
ECOAN requires the community to agree to adhere to these laws and in return provides 
community benefits not directly related to conservation (see “Community Development” in 
Table 10; Aucca, 2009). 
 
From the regression results presented in Table 8, we see that no demographic variables affect the 
likelihood that a household will conserve Polylepis, but one income variable does. Households 
that receive a greater livestock income are less likely to be a conservationist household. This is 
notable since two of the four forest-degrading activities are related to livestock rearing: burning 
pastures for regeneration of grass and allowing livestock to graze in the forest. Households more 
reliant on income from rearing livestock are thus seemingly less likely to decrease those forest-
degrading activities involving livestock. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Those individuals that agreed with more statements about the ES provided by Polylepis forests 
(see Table 1) are significantly more likely to be from conservationist households, providing some 
construct validity. Most importantly, the likelihood that a household will be conservationist is 
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significantly related to the level of community conservation that ECOAN has carried out in that 
community, including whether the community owns a private conservation area (PCA). 
 
4.2. Implied WTP for ES 
The distribution of compensation amounts to change land use required by individual households, 
before and after the discussion of ES, is depicted in Figure 1. Because these values are bounded 
at 0, they follow a lognormal distribution.2 The figure shows that the discussion of ES benefits 
had the effect of moving the WTA distribution to the left, with more people requiring lower 
compensation amounts and less people requiring higher compensation amounts than initially. On 
average, when reminded of the benefits of ES previously discussed, each respondent decreased 
their required compensation amount by 127 soles (~ USD 42) per topo. As indicated in Figure 2, 
this WTPIMPLIED also follows a lognormal distribution, with the median value being 75 soles (~ 
USD 25) per topo. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Based on the OLS regression of WTPIMPLIED for ES (Table 9), we find that WTPIMPLIED is 
negatively correlated with two variables. Respondents that receive a higher livestock income 
reported a lower WTPIMPLIED, which aligns with the fact that livestock rearing includes two 
forest-degrading activities. Additionally, respondents that cultivate a greater proportion of their 
land have a smaller implied value of ES, very likely indicating a higher opportunity cost for 
                                                 
2
 The mean and median annual WTABEFORE are 783.47 soles and 700 soles (USD 261.16 and USD 233.33) per topo 
(1/3 hectare), respectively. The mean and median annual WTAAFTER are 656.30 soles and 562.5 soles (USD 218.77 
and USD 187.5) per topo, respectively. These compensation values should not be viewed as the exact payments 
necessary to cover the opportunity costs of reforestation under an actual PES scheme in the area. Household 
compensation values to switch land use to reforestation were elicited only in order to arrive at an estimate of the 
value that households place on ES, which as explained above was elicited as the difference between compensation 
amounts, i.e. as a foregone compensation (WTPIMPLIED). In reality, because the land is community-owned, any PES 
scheme would have to determine the opportunity cost of total community land, which would be much lower because 
the community has a larger percentage of its land available for such activities, the majority of which is pasture as 
opposed to crop land (lower value per hectare and more substitutable). 
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setting aside land because they had less land available. A land constraint such as that implies 
construct validity of the WTPIMPLIED values reported. Validity is also supported by the fact that 
respondents that agreed with more statements on the ES provided by Polylepis were found to 
have a higher implied value for those ES.3 
 
Besides number of ES respondents believed in, only three other variables have a positive and 
significant association with the value of ES. First, amount of household income from working as 
a porter on nature-based tourism treks is a significant indicator for increased WTPIMPLIED. These 
households have either a greater appreciation for the local value of ES or simply a better 
understanding of the value gained through tourism. Second, if the respondent was a wife of the 
household, that also increased the valuation response, potentially because women are responsible 
for collecting non-timber forest products, particularly medicinal plants.  Third, respondents in 
communities in which ECOAN has reforested more Polylepis also value ES more.  
 
Interestingly, the variables that have a positive association with WTPIMPLIED (i.e. POLYLEPIS, 
CAMINOS and WIFE) have to do with respondents’ direct experience with forests. In contrast, 
ECOAN’s implementation of indirect conservation mechanisms and establishment of 
community-owned conservation areas (i.e. ECOAN_INDIRECT and PCA) are not significantly 
correlated with the value attached to ES. So although households recognize the value of ES, their 
WTPIMPLIED is seemingly associated with their experience with forests and not their experience 
with community conservation. As indicated above, however, conservation behavior that acted on 
that value was not carried out unless encouraged and facilitated by mechanisms such as those 
provided by community conservation.  
 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Effects of Community Conservation in the Vilcanota Range 
The discussion presented here, reflects on the empirical results presented above, and places them 
in context of the qualitative results from the semi-structured interviews with community leaders 
and qualitative responses by survey respondents. Summarizing the regression results, Table 10 
                                                 
3
 WTA before and after the discussion of ES was also analysed using robust OLS. The results are not presented here, 
but the number of ES individuals believed in had no significant effect on WTA, which helps to validate the method 
carried out here based on implied WTP. 
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presents the key results from both the logistic regression of conservation (Table 8) and the OLS 
of the local value of ES (Table 9). 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
The OLS regression results indicate that the level of community conservation carried out by 
ECOAN does not correlate with the value of ES held by respondents. That value is instead 
correlated with respondent characteristics, particularly three that pertain to direct experience with 
the benefits of forests: amount of reforestation around their community, amount of household 
income dependent on treks, and whether or not the respondent is female. Causality is not clear in 
this case, but there is a reasonable argument for direct experience with forests increasing one’s 
value of it. More importantly, there is no indication that community conservation affects that 
value.  
 
In contrast, the logit results indicate that ECOAN’s implementation of community conservation, 
and very little else, is significantly associated with the probability of being a conservationist 
household. Importantly, because the survey questions related to forest-degrading activities were 
framed as a change in behavior before and after the introduction of community conservation, we 
can infer at least some degree of causality of community conservation on the probability of being 
a conservationist household. The reported reasons attributable to ECOAN for why households 
reduced forest degradation can be placed into three main categories: reduced dependence, 
conservation, and prohibitions. 
 
These three categories of motivation for reducing forest degradation can be discussed in terms of 
the two broad classes of interventions for behavior change described by psychologists. The first 
are structural interventions, which include provision of alternatives, regulation and enforcement, 
and financial-economic stimuli (Schmuck & Vlek, 2003), and are generally the focus of 
economists. The second are cognitive interventions, which include provision of information and 




The first category of ECOAN-related reasons given for carrying out conservationist behavior 
was reduced dependence. ECOAN provided non-Polylepis fuel wood, greenhouses and energy-
efficiency stoves that improved households’ ability to conserve the forest by reducing their 
dependence on forest-degradation. By providing these alternatives, ECOAN implemented a 
structural intervention that provided alternatives to their historically forest-degrading livelihoods. 
 
The second category was conservation. With alternatives becoming available, households must 
still have an understanding of the need and methods to conserve. Education to these ends was an 
explicit activity carried out by ECOAN, but also a dominant component of all its other activities, 
that was a cognitive intervention to support pro-conservationist behavior. 
 
The most important of ECOAN’s actions was building a community consensus around 
conservation; the cognitive intervention of social influence. ECOAN’s engagement with 
communities depended on the community agreeing to adhere to the forest law prohibiting 
removal of trees from native forest. As part of that effort, community benefits were provided and 
framed as a reward for good environmental behavior, although conditionality on that reward was 
very loose. The loose conditionality appears effective, however, as indicated by the percent of 
respondents claiming prohibitions as their motive for reducing forest-degrading activities. 
Importantly, ECOAN provided social benefits at a community level, engaging community 
leaders to make sure their community adhered to conservation practices and concurrently making 
it unacceptable within the community to deforest. Overall, this created a culture of conservation: 
where it was once acceptable to deforest, now it is not. 
 
That culture was clearly present in the communities surveyed. When asked if there will be 
enough forests in the future for our children and grandchildren, 46 percent of respondents said 
“no.” All of these respondents claimed that more needed to be done to protect the forests while 
indicating an earnest desire to do so. Of the 54 percent of respondents that answered “yes,” when 
asked why, all of them qualified their response with a belief that continued and improved 
conservation is required to secure that future. Whether they responded “yes” or “no” to this 
question did not matter. The important outcome was that 100 percent of respondents stated a 
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belief in conserving Polylepis.4 Further the semi-structured portions of research and qualitative 
responses in surveys strongly supported the notion of a community consensus around 
conservation, as put by one respondent “hay una conciencia de conservación.” Indeed creating 
communities and social norms within them is the prime mechanism through which community 
conservation works (Pretty, 2003). 
 
Overall, ECOAN’s strategy to promote forest conservation included various activities, all of 
which fall within the traditional definition of community conservation. Based on the motivations 
most cited by respondents for not carrying out forest-degrading activities, two clear themes 
emerge. First, ECOAN’s community conservation activities were successful in part because they 
included a blend of structural and cognitive interventions. Second, the cognitive intervention of 
social influences was reportedly the most important. Further, it is important to recognize that 
community conservation activities, at least in this instance, were not able to change people’s 
values for forest. That seemingly takes some other form of intervention, potentially direct 
experience with it as indicated by the valuation results. 
 
As discussed above, ECOAN is searching for a more self sufficient financing mechanism to 
carry them into the future. With some early eco-tourism experience, PES has been suggested as a 
potential to provide that financing in the future. Due to space constraints, an in-depth discussion 
of feasibility of PES in this area does not fit here. One important point in favor of it, however, is 
that a social context that is conducive to PES has been established. That is a potentially 
necessary step for successful market-based conservation, as we now discuss. 
 
5.2. Developing a pro-conservation social context: A first-stage to PES? 
One key factor affecting the feasibility of PES is the potentially high costs of developing the 
necessary conditions to support such a scheme. That can involve “establishing the principle; 
developing the necessary institutions; addressing issues of property rights and tenure; ensuring 
                                                 
4
 There may be concern that because the survey was carried out through ECOAN there might have been some 
interviewer bias, particularly in this question. The interviewers, however, noted sincerity on the part of respondents 
for this response. Further, there was no change in the response based on whether the interviewer was an ECOAN 
project manager, a temporary/new ECOAN employee, or not an ECOAN employee. Indeed, for the valuation 
questions, dummy variables for interviewers were included in initial analyses and found to have no significant 
explanatory power, providing further support to the claim that interviewer bias was minimized. 
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that there are supportive administrative and judicial processes; providing education and 
training on contracts, management, monitoring and enforcement; and encouraging the adoption 
of non-agricultural livelihoods” (Frost & Bond 2008, pp. 785). 
 
Funding the costs associated with establishing the conditions for PES through the payments 
themselves runs the risk of raising the price to buyers to unaffordable levels or reducing the 
benefits to suppliers to un-incentivizing levels. The success of PES may be limited in places 
where a supportive environment does not already exist. To overcome this difficulty, Frost and 
Bond (2008, pp. 785) suggest “a two stage approach: an initial phase, supported externally to 
establish the necessary conditions, followed by an operational phase governed by free-market 
principles.” 
 
That notion is intuitive: similar to a business investment, the fixed capital must be established 
with the up-front costs underwritten before a market-mechanism can be effectively implemented. 
Those concepts are even being played out at the international level. For example, a proposed 
three-phased approach to reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) 
(Meridian Institute, 2009) is providing the basis for discussions on how to effectively implement 
greater inclusion of forest carbon in international climate change agreements. 
 
To date, however, the staged (or phased) approach to PES has defined “necessary conditions” 
primarily as the need for interventions related to formal institutions such as creating 
representative governing bodies, securing property rights, improving contracts, etc. Adequate 
institutions are essential for the success of PES, but we must also consider the local behaviors 
and attitudes towards conservation in the area PES is to be implemented in. 
 
An important question in discussing use of common-pool or open-access resources is whether 
overuse and conflict are best dealt with through “strict regulatory policies set by higher level 
governments, or that instead one should rely on endogenous formation of use regimes” (van den 
Bergh, 2007, pp. 530). One particularly significant finding is that externally imposed rules and 
monitoring can reduce, de-stabilize, or even completely destroy co-operation over common-pool 
resource use (Ostrom, 2000). Or similarly, “if the rules are seen to come from another 
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stakeholder group (or from ‘above’) then the legitimacy of the rules and compliance by local 
stakeholders is greatly compromised (Marshall, 2005).” (Fisher et al, 2010, pp. 1258). 
 
That raises the question, when a PES program is implemented does it support or contradict the 
social norms and attitudes towards conservation held by the individuals it is trying to 
incentivize? Research relevant to this question is sparse, but what is available indicates this 
question is important. For example, Ma et al (2010) found that attitudes can affect a US farmer’s 
willingness to consider enrolling in an agri-environmental scheme. Further, Chen et al (2009) 
found that neighborhood-level social norms influenced the re-enrolment rates of farmers in 
China’s grain-to-green program (Chen et al, 2009). 
 
Importantly, those results are based on the action of individuals on excludible land. A large 
portion of PES schemes, already implemented or being developed, are in the context of 1) 
communities (not individuals along) and 2) protection of rival, but non-excludible resources, 
both of which imply a much larger concern for the social context. 
 
The first stage of two-stage PES should therefore not only focus on establishing the formal 
institutional components of PES, but must also establish a social context conducive to PES. 
Community conservation can provide lessons on, or potentially even be a model for, achieving 
that. Community-based initiatives for resource management work through various mechanisms 
designed to develop new social norms and attitudes (Pretty, 2003), and the empirical results 
presented here indicate that those mechanisms were successful in developing the new forest-
friendly behaviors and attitudes that Abbot and Thomas (2001) suggested should be the metric 
for success of community conservation. 
 
5.3. Second Stage of Two-stage PES 
Once the social context is conducive to the conservation that PES is intended to incentivize, 
direct payments may be more effective. Although proponents of the traditional view of direct 
PES might not agree, the revisionist thinking urges a review of how incentives are perceived. As 
discussed above, if viewed as externally imposed rules, they can destabilize any hope of 
common-pool or open-access resource management. Further, as often discussed in the re-
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conceptualization of PES (e.g., Sommerville et al, 2009; Farley and Costanza, 2010) an extrinsic 
incentive, particularly a cash incentive, can have negative consequences; it can backfire. 
 
To overcome those negative effects, incentives must be perceived as supportive, rather than 
coercive (Frey and Jegen, 2001). It is intuitively much easier to frame an incentive for 
conservation as supportive if the attitudes and behaviors of locals are ex-ante suited to 
conservation. Otherwise, in the case of communities, that incentive can easily be viewed as 
welfare pay-off for excluding locals from natural resources (Hutton et al., 2005; van Noordwijk 
& Leimona, 2009), which is perceived as coercive or implemented “from above.” So a second 
stage of PES should perhaps view the role of incentives not to change behavior, but rather to 
support and reinforce conservation behaviors. Indeed, as PES revisionists evoke more lessons on 
incentives from psychology and behavioral economics, it may be worth a broader review of 
incentives’ role to reinforce rather than to change behavior.  
 
6. Conclusion 
By working through community conservation ECOAN promoted conservationist attitudes and 
behaviors, supporting the conjecture that community conservation delivers important outcomes 
for conservation to succeed. The PES literature is increasingly recognizing the importance of 
those outcomes and making reference to interventions to affect them that are common in 
community conservation. Building on the results presented here, the PES literature and the 
behavioral literature it evokes, we find support, from a behavioral perspective, for the suggestion 
that PES may be most effectively implemented in a two-stage approach. While building the 
necessary institutions for PES, the first stage would be based in whole or in part on community 
conservation, specifically its cognitive and structural mechanisms for supporting the uptake of 
new behaviors and attitudes. The second stage could then provide more explicit incentives 
through market-based mechanisms (e.g. carbon credits, water payments, price premium on green 
commodities) that reinforce the new conservationist behavior. Future research should further 
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Survey questions 1) on change in forest-degrading activities, and 2) implied contingent valuation 







- There are families that cut Polylepis trees for fuelwood. Do you do 
this now? Yes or No, Location if yes:…………… 
- Did you do this in the past? Yes or No, Location if yes:…………… 
- In the past did you do it: More, Less or the Same 
- Why is there a difference between before and now? …………… 
 
WTABEFORE - So that ECOAN could reforest, for how much per year would you rent 
one topo (~1/3 hectare) of your land? …………… 
- So that ECOAN could reforest, how much would you charge to work and 
reforest in this topo of land that you have rented out? …………… 
WTAAFTER - Before, you told me that you would need (X) to rent one topo (or work in 
this topo of land) of your land for reforestation. Now, knowing that the 
forests give all of these benefits, would you lower that amount? Yes or No 
- To what? …………… 
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Table 1. Ecosystem services provided by Polylepis forests in the Andes Mountains and discussed 









The densely-packed, small leaves of 
Polylepis trees harvest occult precipitation 
from the frequent mists of the mountains, 
providing an additional supply of water in 
rainless periods. 
 Fjeldsa, 2002 
Water 
regulation 
The woodlands, with associated mosses, 
regulate the flow of water and so reduce 













[The trees] provide protection against 
erosion, stabilising the soil with its roots, and 








Wild potatoes, ulluco and oca grow inside 
Polylepis woodlands, providing a genetic 










Several plants from Polylepis woodlands 





Polylepis was an indispensable component of 
everyday life in ancient Andean empires and 
remains a vital source of natural resources 






In the monotonous Andean grasslands and 
semi-deserts, Polylepis forests represent 
oases of life, including 51 bird species that 








Fjeldsa, 2002  
Carbon 
storage 
Cost-competitive carbon offsets from forestry 
are possible with Polylepis grown at high 
altitudes. 
 
Fehsea et al, 
2002 
* Although genetic diversity is a valuable ecosystem service, pilot surveys and stakeholder discussions concluded 
that this service was the most complex to discuss, so it was not included in the final survey. 
** Two discussion points on biodiversity protection were presented in the survey, one on birds and another on 
“other animals”. Polylepis woodlands are particularly well known for bird diversity, attracting ecotourism, so it was 
believed that a separate discussion on birds was warranted. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of sampled households (HH) in the Vilcanota Range*.  
Characteristic Mean 
HH Size 4.6 people 
Education   
     Adult males 5 years in local primary school 
     Adult females 4 years in local primary school 
     Teenagers 9 years in local schools 
Cash Income   
     Farm activities 157 USD annually 
     Non-farm activities 621 USD annually 
     Total per capita 3.1 USD daily 
Land Holding   
     Total held 1.67 hectares 
     Cultivated at a time 0.6 hectares 
     Crop Production 1,600 kilos annually 
     “Own” land** 30 percent of HH 
Livestock   
     Kept 25.6  
     Slaughtered 2 annually 
* The values presented are based on a sample of 106 households in the Vilcanota Range that were surveyed for this 
study. 
**Land title is actually held by the community or land association a household belongs to, but these households still 
stated that they owned the land they held. 
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Table 3. ECOAN’s community conservation activities in the Vilcanota range. 
Issue Initiative Goal 
Fuelwood 
demand 
Direct Eucalyptus fuelwood 
provision Provide energy alternative 
Low-impact Eucalyptus 
plantations Provide energy alternative 
Energy-efficient stoves Reduce demand for fuel wood 
Land Use 
Reforestation Increase habitat for wildlife and provision of ecosystem services 
Greenhouses 
Diversify livelihoods through 
agricultural alternatives (some 
provided to schools to foster early 
environmental appreciation and 
supplement school lunches) 
Land Titles Secure property rights 
Environmental Education Educate locals on need and methods to conserve woodlands 
Private Conservation Area 
(PCA) 
Directly conserve Polylepis and 




Support development and reward 




Chimneys Decrease indoor air pollution and 




Table 4. Communities and households surveyed to analyze the potential for PES in the Vilcanota 
Range. (HH = Number of households) 





Easy Yanahuara Mantanay 1600 25 1.56 
Moderate Huilloc Queuñacocha 880 22 2.50 
Patacancha (buffer zone) 512 23 4.49 
Difficult 
 
Tambohuaylla Silatexse 260 10 3.85 
Quishuarani Hatun-Huchuy  Queuña 220 19 8.64 
Cuncani (buffer zone) 312 7 2.24 
Communities surveyed 3784 106 2.80 
All communities 7299 106 1.45 
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Table 5. Explanatory variables used in logit regressions of conservationist households and OLS 








c AGE Age of the respondent 
EDUCATION Years respondent was in school 
WIFE* Respondent is the wife of the household 
CHILD* Respondent is eldest child living in household 





CROP_INCOME Annual cash income (soles) from crops sold  
LIVESTOCK_ INCOME Annual income (soles) from livestock sold 
CAMINOS Annual income (soles) from working part-time as a porter, cook, or horse handler on tourist treks 
TRADE Annual income (soles) from selling goods 




LAND_USED Proportion of land held by household that is cultivated 
each year 
LAND_OWN Household claims ownership of land separate from 
community 
CROP_INCREASE* Crop production increased in the past year 
CROP_DECREASE* Crop production decreased in the past year 








Average count of types of ECOAN benefits received 
each year since a community started working with 
ECOAN (does not include PCA establishment or 
direct Polylepis reforestation). 
PCA* Community owns a private conservation area (PCA), 
establishment of which was supported by ECOAN. 
POLYLEPIS Cumulative number of Polylepis saplings planted by ECOAN near community. 
*Dummy variables. Baseline for WIFE and CHILD was “male head of household” (i.e. father/husband); baseline for 
CROP_INCREASE and CROP_DECREASE was “no change”; PCA is a binary dummy.
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Table 6. Proportion of households that reported having reduced, maintained or increased their 
level of each of the four primary forest degrading activities. 
 Fuelwood Grazing Livestock 
Agriculture 
Transformation Burning Combined 
Reduced (a) 81.36 71.43 73.08 88.89 77.21 
Maintained 
(b) 11.86 19.05 7.69 11.11 13.24 




74.58 61.90 53.85 88.89 67.65 
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Table 7. Reason given for reducing forest-degrading activities (percent provided is aggregated 
over four primary anthropogenic threats to Polylepis). 




Energy use change 15 
Conservation 14 
Subtotal 69 
Not attributable to 
ECOAN 









Table 8. Estimated parameters for conservationist households model (Logit model with robust 
standard errors (SE), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01) 








AGE  0.007  0.032 
EDUCATION - 0.017  0.092 
WIFE 
 1.220  1.145 
CHILD 
 0.119  1.226 






 0.270  0.492 
LIVESTOCK_INCOME (/1000) - 1.039 * 0.582 
CAMINOS (/1000) 
 0.098  0.229 
TRADE (/1000) - 0.519  0.588 
CONSTRUCTION (/1000) 





 1.153  0.962 
LAND_OWN - 0.623  0.724 
CROP_INCREASE - 1.133  0.861 
CROP_DECREASE 
 0.205  0.769 
ES_TOTAL 






 0.997 ** 0.462 
PCA 
 2.544 *** 0.840 
POLYLEPIS (/1000) 
 0.063  0.047 
 
_CONS - 15.542 ** 7.089 
Observations 106 
Pseudo-R2  0.224 
 Log pseudolikelihood -48.293 
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Table 9. Estimated parameters for WTPIMPLIED for ecosystem services model (OLS with Robust 
SE, *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01) 








AGE  0.532  1.155 
EDUCATION - 0.416  4.929 
WIFE 
 77.913 * 44.853 
CHILD - 50.086  44.020 






 27.124  17.982 
LIVESTOCK_INCOME (/1000) - 69.776 *** 23.612 
CAMINOS (/1000) 
 33.532 *** 10.616 
TRADE (/1000) - 31.420  25.858 
CONSTRUCTION (/1000) 




LAND_USED - 80.113 * 43.688 
LAND_OWN - 54.527  34.735 
CROP_INCREASE - 50.717  34.298 
CROP_DECREASE - 40.075  32.903 
ES_TOTAL 





 ECOAN_INDIRECT - 25.407  19.425 
PCA - 42.321  31.985 
POLYLEPIS (/1000) 
 5.414 ** 2.518 
 
_CONS (x1000) - 0.277  0.227 
Observations 106 
R2  0.345 
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Table 10. Comparing the effect of community conservation on the household value of ecosystem 
services provided by Polylepis and the likelihood of a household being conservationist (+p<0.10, 
++p<0.05, +++p<0.01). 
Variable Value of ES for 
households 
(WTPIMPLIED) (OLS) 
Probability of being a 
conservationist 
household (Logit) 
ES_TOTAL ++ + 
ECOAN_INDIRECT . ++ 
PCA . +++ 
POLYLEPIS ++ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
